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In quantum cryptosystems, variations in detector efficiency can be exploited to stage a successful
attack. This happens when the efficiencies of Bob’s two detectors are different functions of a control
parameter accessible to Eve (e.g., timing of the incoming pulses). It has previously been shown that
the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is vulnerable to this attack. In this paper, we show that
several other protocols and encodings may also be vulnerable. We consider a faked states attack
in the case of a partial efficiency mismatch on the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04)
protocol, and derive the quantum bit error rate as a function of detector efficiencies. Additionally,
it is shown how faked states can in principle be constructed for quantum cryptosystems that use a
phase-time encoding, the differential phase shift keying (DPSK) and the Ekert protocols.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that
allows remote parties to grow shared secret random key
at a steady rate, given an insecure optical communica-
tion channel and an initially authenticated classical com-
munication channel between them [1, 2]. Since the first
experimental demonstration eighteen years ago [1], QKD
systems have developed to commercial devices working
over tens of kilometers of optical fiber [3], as well as ex-
periments over more than a hundred kilometers of fiber
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], 23 km and 144 km of free space
[10, 11, 12]. Although the security of QKD has been
unconditionally proven for a model of equipment that
includes certain non-idealities [13, 14, 15, 16, 17], not
all real properties of optical and electrooptical compo-
nents have been included into the proof. Identifying
the properties of components potentially dangerous for
security and integrating them into the proof (or clos-
ing the issue in some other way) is an ongoing work
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24].
In this paper, we continue to analyse a common im-
perfection of Bob’s single photon detectors: variation of
their efficiency that can be controlled by Eve via a choice
of an external parameter. It has been shown in Refs. 21
and 22 that even smallest variations of one detector effi-
ciency relative to the other detector reduce the amount
of secret information theoretically available to Alice and
Bob in the case of the BB84 protocol. The amount of
key compression during the privacy amplification must
be adjusted based on an evaluation of the worst-case ef-
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ficiency mismatch of Bob’s detectors. We recap these
results in Sec. II. In the following sections, we consider
other protocols and encodings: SARG04 in Sec. III, a
class of schemes using the phase-time encoding and the
DPSK protocol in Sec. IV, and the Ekert protocol with a
source of entangled photons in Sec. V. It is shown how to
construct a faked states attack [20] against these proto-
cols and encodings. For the SARG04, the upper bound
on available secret key information is estimated, through
calculating the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused
by this attack in the case of a partial efficiency mis-
match. For the other protocols, we consider the case
of a total efficiency mismatch only and make no quanti-
tative estimates. Although the case of the total efficiency
mismatch can occur in practice [21], usually detectors in
a QKD system will merely have some partial efficiency
mismatch. This work is thus the first step in analysing
detector efficiency mismatch in these protocols.
II. BB84 PROTOCOL
Variation of efficiency is a common and, indeed, un-
avoidable imperfection of single photon detectors. The
efficiency may depend on the timing of incoming light
pulse (e.g., in gated detectors based on avalanche pho-
todiodes), wavelength of incoming light (e.g., in up-
conversion detectors [25, 26, 27]), polarization and
other parameters conceivably controllable by Eve. In
QKD schemes that employ two detectors (or a time-
multiplexed detector), the variation will be different be-
tween the detectors (or detection windows), allowing Eve
to control the relative probability of one detection out-
come over the other.
To illustrate how she can use this to construct a suc-
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2cessful attack on the BB84 protocol [1], we assume at
first that the efficiency mismatch for some values of the
control parameter is so large that Eve can practically
blind either detector while the other remains sensitive.
This situation is called a total efficiency mismatch. We
call the value of the control parameter that blinds the 1
detector t0, and the value that blinds the 0 detector t1.
Eve then proceeds with an intercept-resend attack: she
uses a replica of Bob’s setup to detect every Alice’s state,
and resends certain states of light to Bob. It is well known
that a straightforward intercept-resend attack, in which
Eve resends quantum states that simply repeat her detec-
tion results (bit value and basis), is doomed to fail. This
is because Eve does not know Alice’s basis, will thus de-
tect half of Alice’s qubits in a wrong basis, and cause
25% errors in Bob’s key. However, our intercept-resend
attack has an important twist: Eve sends states of light
that only get detected by Bob when he chooses the same
basis as Eve, otherwise they cause no click in Bob’s detec-
tors (we’ll explain in a moment how Eve achieves this).
In such a case, all Eve’s detections in a wrong basis be-
long to the qubits detected by Bob in the same wrong
basis, and are discarded by Alice and Bob during sifting.
What remain after sifting are those bits which have been
sent by Alice, detected by Eve and detected by Bob in
the same basis for all three parties. This key is error-free,
and Eve knows every bit of it.
The intercept-resend attack “with a twist” described
above is a faked states attack, and the specially formed
light states Eve resends to Bob are called faked states
[20]. The faked state Eve resends in our case would be
a state normally used in the protocol but with the op-
posite bit value in the opposite basis comparing to what
she has detected. At the same time, in the faked state
Eve sets the value of the control parameter that blinds
the detector for the opposite bit value from what she has
detected. For example, suppose Eve has detected the 0
bit value in the X basis. She resends the 1 bit in the
Z basis, with the control parameter t0. If Bob tries to
detect this faked state in the Z basis, he never detects
anything, for his 1 detector is blinded by Eve’s choice of
the control parameter. If he tries to detect in the X ba-
sis, he with equal probability doesn’t detect anything or
detects the 0 bit. The reader may notice that the attack
reduces the detection probability at Bob, but this can be
compensated by a proportionally increased brightness of
the faked states. Thus, in the case of the total efficiency
mismatch, Eve can run a faked states attack that causes
zero QBER and gives her full information on the key [21].
In the case of a partial efficiency mismatch, when either
detector cannot be completely blinded, this attack causes
some non-zero QBER. Eve can pick the values of the
control parameter to minimize the ratios η0(t1)/η1(t1)
and η1(t0)/η0(t0), where η0 and η1 are efficiencies of the
0 and 1 detectors. It has been shown in Ref. 21 that in
this case the attack causes
(QBER) =
2η0(t1) + 2η1(t0)
η0(t0) + 3η0(t1) + 3η1(t0) + η1(t1)
. (1)
In the special case of symmetric detector efficiency curves
η0(t1)/η1(t1) = η1(t0)/η0(t0) ≡ η and Eve adjusting the
brightness of her faked states sent with t0 and t1 such
that Bob’s detection probability for both values of the
control parameter remains equal, this simplifies to
(QBER) =
2η
1 + 3η
. (2)
The QBER value of 0.11 (commonly regarded as the
threshold value for the BB84 protocol, after which no
secret key could be extracted) would be reached at η ≈
1/15.
The attack described above is not necessarily optimal.
In Ref. 21 we say that the BB84 protocol is secure pro-
vided (QBER) . 0.11η and an extra amount of privacy
amplification is applied. However, it has since been no-
ticed that Eq. 11 in Ref. 21, on which this conclusion
is based, is incorrect. It follows from Eq. 11 that if
QBER is zero, Eve has no information. Qi and coworkers
have pointed out that when Eve can affect Bob’s detec-
tor efficiencies, she gets partial information about the key
from Bob’s announcement of which qubits have actually
arrived [22]. Thus the available bit rate after privacy
amplification is reduced even in the case (QBER) = 0.
This makes possible the so-called time-shift attack, in
which Eve alters randomly the control parameter of the
qubits without otherwise interacting with them [22, 23].
A purely classical side-channel attack on a system where
Bob measures and announces detection timing has also
been proposed [24]. A more general theory, which is not
yet available, would encompass the time-shift (or, more
generally, parameter-shift) attacks into the equation for
the available bit rate.
III. SARG04 PROTOCOL
The purpose of the SARG04 protocol [28, 29, 30] is
to increase the maximum trasmission distance and key
yield in schemes that use a weak coherent source; the
protocol has improved characteristics against the photon
number splitting attack, comparing to the BB84. Here
we consider the version of the SARG04 that uses states
physically equivalent to those used in the BB84 (Fig. 1),
and differs from the latter only at the sifting stage. The
bit values 0 and 1 in the SARG04 are encoded by the
choice of basis. Alice sends randomly one of the four
states |0a〉, |0b〉, |1a〉 or |1b〉. Bob measures either in the
0 or 1 detection basis, and uses two detectors labeled a
and b. At the sifting stage, Alice announces publicly a
set of two states that contains the actual state sent and
a random state from the opposite basis. For definiteness,
suppose that Alice has sent |0a〉 and that she has an-
nounced the set {|0a〉, |1a〉}. If Bob has measured in the
0 basis, he has certainly got the result 0a; but since this
result is possible for both states in the set {|0a〉, |1a〉},
he has to discard it. If he has measured in the 1 basis
and got 1a, he again cannot discriminate. But if he has
3|0a
|1b
|1a
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FIG. 1: States configuration for the SARG04 protocol in the
case when the states used are physically equivalent to those
in the BB84 protocol. The circle represents the equator of
the Poincare sphere.
measured in the 1 basis and got 1b, he knows that Alice
has sent |0a〉, and adds 0 to his key.
Since this protocol uses the same states as the BB84,
the faked states attack described in the previous section
could be applied to it. In the case of the total efficiency
mismatch, it obviously causes zero QBER. To calculate
the QBER it causes in the case of the partial efficiency
mismatch, we follow the approach of Ref. 21 and consider
all the possible basis and detector combinations during
the attack. The different events are shown in Table I
for the special case where Alice sends the |0a〉 state (the
other three cases are symmetrical to this case). We dis-
regard the probability of Eve’s and Bob’s detectors firing
simultaneously due to the multiphoton fraction of the
pulses, assume that Bob’s detectors have no dark counts,
assume that Eve’s detectors and optical alignment are
perfect, and that Eve generates faked states that match
the optical alignment in Bob’s setup perfectly. None of
these assumptions is critical for the attack to work, but
it is convenient to make them in order to simplify the
calculation.
Based on the probabilities in the table, we calculate
the QBER caused by the attack. When Alice sends the
|0a〉 state, the probability that the qubit arrives at Bob
and is not discarded as an inconclusive detection result
during sifting is
P (arrive|A=0a)=18 [
1
4
ηa(ta)+
1
4
ηa(tb)+
13
4
ηb(ta)+
1
4
ηb(tb)].
(3)
The probability of arrival averaged over Alice’s four state
choices is found by symmetrization of this equation,
yielding
P (arrive) =
1
32
[ηa(ta) + 7ηa(tb) + 7ηb(ta) + ηb(tb)]. (4)
Similarly, we find the QBER,
(QBER)=
P (error)
P (arrive)
=
4ηa(tb) + 4ηb(ta)
ηa(ta) + 7ηa(tb) + 7ηb(ta) + ηb(tb)
,
(5)
where P (error) accounts for the cases when Bob keeps a
bit value different from what Alice has sent.
TABLE I: The intercept-resend attack on the SARG04 pro-
tocol when Alice sends the |0a〉 state (as indicated in the first
column; in the table, brackets around states are omitted for
clarity). The second column contains the basis chosen by Eve
and the measurement result; the third column shows the state
and timing as resent by Eve. In the next columns Bob’s basis
choice and measurement results are given. For the case with
the partial detector sensitivity mismatch, the probabilities for
the different results are shown, given Eve’s state and timing
in addition to Bob’s basis. In the last two columns, pairs of
states announced by Alice during sifting (two possible pairs
announced with equal probability of 1/2), and the sifting re-
sults, are shown. Note that, for ease of discussion, the first
two rows are repeated so that each row in the table occurs
with probability 1/8.
Alice →Eve Eve→ Bob Result,
Probability
Alice’s
announce
Sifting
0a 0a 1bta 0 a,
1
2
ηa(ta) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} Discard
b, 1
2
ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 1a (error)
{0a, 1b} 1b (error)
0a 0a 1bta 1 a, 0
b, ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 0a (right)
{0a, 1b} Discard
0a 0a 1bta 0 a,
1
2
ηa(ta) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} Discard
b, 1
2
ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 1a (error)
{0a, 1b} 1b (error)
0a 0a 1bta 1 a, 0
b, ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 0a (right)
{0a, 1b} Discard
0a 1a 0bta 0 a, 0
b, ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 1a (error)
{0a, 1b} 1b (error)
0a 1a 0bta 1 a,
1
2
ηa(ta) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} 0a (right)
b, 1
2
ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 0a (right)
{0a, 1b} Discard
0a 1b 0atb 0 a, ηa(tb) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} Discard
b, 0
0a 1b 0atb 1 a,
1
2
ηa(tb) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} 0a (right)
b, 1
2
ηb(tb) {0a, 1a} 0a (right)
{0a, 1b} Discard
In the special case of symmetric detector efficiency
curves, we get
(QBER) =
4η
1 + 7η
. (6)
4Security bounds and operating conditions for the
SARG04 and BB84 protocols are different [30, 31, 32,
33, 34]. The same value of optical misalignment (mea-
sured by, e.g., fringe visibility in the interferometer) leads
to different QBER for the two protocols. The optimal
photon number in a weak-pulse implementation differs
between the protocols, so detector dark counts will make
a different contribution to the QBER as well [30, 33].
Therefore, a system using the same optical hardware
and the same communication line will run at a differ-
ent QBER level for each protocol. If we wanted to
compare the QBER caused by our attack on these two
protocols, it should be done in this context, which is
not at all straightforward. We note, however, that in
SARG04 our attack causes QBER lower than 0.11 when
η . 1/30, while in BB84 (see Eq. 2) the same happens
when η . 1/15. The effect of the described attack on
these two protocols appears to be of the same order of
magnitude.
The faked states attack leads to reduced bit rate ac-
cording to Eq. 4. Eve may compensate this by resending
a brighter signal. Alternatively, she may place her mea-
surement device close to Alice and her resend device close
to Bob, getting rid of the channel loss. The attack may
also lead to altered coincidence count rates at Bob. How-
ever, with the help of timing and state parameters, Eve
may have several degrees of freedom to compensate this
as well. For example, by eliminating the channel loss
and resending single photons, the coincidence detections
may be eliminated. Furthermore, the ability to do pho-
ton number measurement on Alice’s pulses would allow
Eve to completely remove her influence on coincidence
counts [21]. She could, for instance, only attack single-
photon pulses, while passing multi-photon ones (those
that cause coincidence counts) to Bob undisturbed, at the
cost of not getting a small fraction of the key. How much
Eve would have to do in practice depends, of course, on
the actual checks Bob implements (or not implements, as
may be the case).
IV. PHASE-TIME ENCODING AND DPSK
PROTOCOL
In a QKD system with the phase-time encoding [35],
Alice prepares one of the four states: |l〉, |s〉, |l〉+ |s〉 or
|l〉−|s〉, where |l〉 and |s〉 denote states that have travelled
via the long and short arm of Alice’s AMZ (Fig. 2). Bob
gates his detectors three times. The state |l〉 can cause
a detection either in the S1 or S2 time slot. The state
|s〉 can cause a detection either in the S2 or S3 time slot.
The states |l〉 + |s〉 and |l〉 − |s〉} can cause a detection
in any of the three time slots. The plus or minus sign
determines which of the two detectors (D0 or D1) clicks
when the detection happens in the S2 time slot where the
pulses from the two arms of Bob’s AMZ have interfered.
Thus, pairs of states {|l〉, |s〉} and {|l〉+ |s〉, |l〉−|s〉} form
two bases. This system uses the BB84 protocol. (We
note that the function of Bob’s apparatus is similar to
an earlier system that uses entangled photons in energy-
time Bell states [36].)
Faked states for this QKD system are listed in Table II.
Eve uses an apparatus that can form a single pulse (de-
noted |ll〉) in the time slot that follows the time slot of
Alice’s |l〉 state, a single pulse (denoted |ss〉) in the time
slot that precedes the time slot of Alice’s |s〉 state, or co-
herent states consisting of four pulses with certain phase
shifts between them and a certain value of the control
parameter t (which can be timing as shown on the dia-
grams, or some other parameter). The single pulse states
are sent with the control parameter value tnormal that
blinds neither detector. The coherent four pulse states
are sent with the control parameter value t0 or t1 that
blinds the detector D1 or D0. The faked states rely on the
lack of detector gating in what would be Bob’s time slots
S0 and S4, or on Bob discarding detection results with
these times. Additionally, in the last two faked states,
Eve blinds one of Bob’s detectors by the choice of the
control parameter.
In a QKD system with the DPSK protocol [8], Al-
ice randomly modulates the phase of a weak coherent
pulse train by {0, pi} for each pulse, and sends it to Bob
with an average photon number of less than 1 per pulse
(Fig. 3). Bob measures the phase difference between ad-
jacent pulses with a 1-bit delay interferometer followed by
two detectors placed at the interferometer output ports.
Detector D0 clicks when the phase difference is 0 and
detector D1 clicks when the phase difference is pi. Since
the average photon number per pulse is less than 1, Bob
observes clicks only occasionally and in a random time
slot. Bob informs Alice of the time slots in which he has
observed clicks. From her modulation data Alice knows
which detector has clicked on Bob’s side, so they share
an identical bit string.
Faked states for this QKD system are constructed sim-
ilarly to the previous one (Fig. 4). In the case of the
DPSK, Eve can run two generators of faked states in
parallel, so that states with the values of the control pa-
rameter t0 and t1 may overlap. When Eve has had iden-
tical detection results in two adjacent bit slots, she can
use a single-pulse faked state. In all other cases she gen-
erates longer faked states that encompass two or more
detection results with the same bit value. In these faked
states, Bob’s other detector is blocked by the choice of
the control parameter, and unwanted bit slots are blocked
by destructive interference. In the limit, Eve may just
generate two continuous trains of pulses with the control
parameters t0 and t1, and modulate the phase of pulses
in each train to produce the detections she wants at Bob.
In the system in Ref. 8, Bob actually uses non-gated
detectors, registers timing of all counts, and then se-
lects timing ranges in software (this procedure is roughly
equivalent to detector gating). In this system, Bob could
easily implement monitoring of count statistics in the
time domain, thus preventing Eve from using timing as
a control parameter. However, we remind the reader
5FIG. 2: Scheme of a QKD system utilizing the phase-time encoding [35]. SMZ, symmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer; AMZ,
asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer; PM, phase modulator; Att., optical attenuator; D0 and D1, single photon detectors.
FIG. 3: Scheme of a QKD system utilizing the DPSK protocol [8]. IM, intensity modulator; PM, phase modulator; Att., optical
attenuator; D0 and D1, single photon detectors.
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6TABLE II: Faked states for a QKD system utilizing the phase-
time encoding. Each faked state is illustrated by a time dia-
gram. The arrows indicate how every pulse coming to Bob is
split into the two arms of his interferometer. The waveform
for the intensity of light at Bob’s detector that is blinded by
Eve’s choice of the control parameter t is printed in gray.
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that control parameters other than time can be used
by Eve. In this particular system, up-conversion detec-
tors in Bob’s setup employ narrow spectral filtering [26].
Eve could try to control wavelength of incoming pulses
in addition to or instead of their timing.
The part of Eve’s setup that generates faked states for
both systems considered in this section may be similar
to Alice’s setup in Fig. 3. In the case of the DPSK, two
such setups could possibly be used, with their outputs
combined on an optical coupler.
In the first of the two systems considered in this sec-
tion, the system with the phase-time encoding, Bob
would normally observe some coincidence counts at his
detectors. To keep his coincidence rates the same as be-
fore the attack, Eve could occasionally simulate a coinci-
dence count. She can do this by sending to Bob a faked
state or several faked states that simultaneously address
different detectors and/or bit slots. She could also con-
trol the photon number statistics of her faked states and
employ the photon number measurement as described in
the end of Sec. III.
Although we do not calculate it here, the faked states
presented in this section would obviously work in the
case of the partial efficiency mismatch, causing the more
QBER the smaller the mismatch becomes. We note that
schemes utilizing the DPSK protocol with limited-length
states [37, 38] can also be attacked using the methods
considered in this section.
V. EKERT PROTOCOL
The Ekert protocol [39] uses an external source of en-
tangled pairs of photons in a singlet state, from which
one photon is routed to Alice and the other to Bob. Alice
and Bob perform measurements on their photons in one
of the possible bases (Fig. 5), choosing between the bases
randomly and independently of one another for each pair
of incoming photons. After a series of measurements has
taken place, the choices of bases are publicly announced.
For those pairs where Alice and Bob both have registered
a count in their detectors, quantum mechanics guaran-
tees certain degree of correlation between the measure-
ment results, depending on the combination of the bases
chosen. The quantity
E(ai,bj) = P++(ai,bj) + P−−(ai,bj)
−P+−(ai,bj)− P−+(ai,bj) (7)
is the correlation coefficient of the measurements per-
formed by Alice in the ai basis and by Bob in the bj basis.
Here P±±(ai,bj) denotes the probability that the result
±1 has been obtained in the ai basis and ±1 in the bj
basis. For two identical pairs of bases (a2,b1 and a3,b2)
the measurement results are totally anticorrelated:
E(a2,b1) = E(a3,b2) = −1. (8)
These measurement results are used in the protocol to
form a secret key. Four other basis combinations are
used to check for possible eavesdropping via computing
the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt quantity
S = E(a1,b1)− E(a1,b3) + E(a3,b1) + E(a3,b3), (9)
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FIG. 5: Possible measurements by Alice and Bob in the Ekert
protocol. The circles represent the equator of the Poincare
sphere. Measurement bases are denoted by letters with in-
dices; each measurement can yield +1 or −1 result as labeled
on the diagram. EPR, source of entangled photon pairs.
which in the absence of eavesdropping should be equal to
−2√2.
If the pairs of detectors on both Alice’s and Bob’s sides
have a total efficiency mismatch, Eve can successfully
mount a faked states attack that provides S = −2√2.
She substitutes the source of entangled photons with one
that generates, with certain probabilities, pairs of faked
states listed below. We have assumed that, at Alice and
at Bob, one detector is used to get the +1 measurement
result in all three bases, and the other to get the −1 re-
sult. We have also assumed that Alice and Bob normal-
ize detection probabilities separately for each combina-
tion of ai and bj before computing E(ai,bj) correlation
coefficients. Let’s consider, step by step, how Eve can
construct the faked states under these assumptions.
The simplest set of faked states necessary for the attack
to work consists of two pairs of states; however, to make
the +1 and −1 measurements on each side equiprobable,
we’ll be considering symmetric combinations consisting
of two pairs of faked states each. The first combina-
tion named α will be detected with a uniform proba-
bility and always produce total anticorrelation regard-
less of Alice’s and Bob’s choice of basis. It can, for
example, consist of a pair of states conjugate to every
other state used in the protocol and sent to Alice and
Bob with opposite values of the control parameter t+1
and t−1, which blind the −1 and +1 detectors. When
linear polarizations are used in the protocol, Eve can
randomly send to Alice and Bob either a pair of cir-
cular polarizations [(circular)t+1 , (circular)t−1 ] or a pair
[(circular)t−1 , (circular)t+1 ]. If Eve only generated the
combination α and nothing else, it would result in
S = −1− (−1)− 1− 1 = −2. (10)
To reach the desired value of S = −2√2, we’ll now target
the second term in the equation for S. We devise a com-
bination named β that only contributes to the E(a1,b3)
correlation coefficient but not to the other three corre-
lation coefficients in the equation for S. In this combi-
nation, Eve sends either a pair [(|−a3〉)t+1 , (|−b1〉)t+1 ] or
a pair [(|a3〉)t−1 , (|b1〉)t−1 ]. It produces total correlation
for the pair of bases a1,b3, as well as for three other pairs
of bases (a1,b2; a2,b2; a2,b3) which are not used in the
protocol. In the remaining five possible pairs of bases,
the combination β causes no coincident detections. If
the combinations α and β are generated by Eve with
probabilities Pα = 0.586, Pβ = 0.414, it results in
S = −1− (−0.172)− 1− 1 = −2
√
2.1 (11)
Although we have reached the desired value of the quan-
tity S, the terms in the equation for S have unequal
absolute values, which can be noticed by Alice and Bob.
The absolute values of the terms can be made equal, just
as they are in the absence of the attack, if we add a
third combination. The third combination named γ con-
tributes to all four correlation coefficients in the equa-
tion for S. In this combination, Eve sends either a pair
[(|−a2〉)t+1 , (|−b2〉)t+1 ] or a pair [(|a2〉)t−1 , (|b2〉)t−1 ]. It
produces total correlation for the four pairs of bases
used in computing S. It is easy to check that when
the combinations are generated by Eve with probabili-
ties Pα = 0.116, Pβ = 0.653, Pγ = 0.231, it results in
S = −0.707− (+0.707)− 0.707− 0.707 = −2
√
2. (12)
Note that of the three combinations α, β, γ, only α
causes coincident detections in the pairs of bases a2,b1
and a3,b2 used to form the secret key. Detection results
in these two pairs of bases are thus totally anticorrelated
and the key is error-free.
Although our attack reproduces the expected value of
S, it has side effects. Detection probabilities for differ-
ent combinations of bases become substantially unequal,
and the three unused correlation coefficients are not re-
produced properly. Thus, the attack relies on the absence
of additional consistency checks on the data by the legit-
imate users. We have not been able to come up with a
set of faked states that does not produce any side effects.
Also, the attack relies on the source of entangled photons
being outside of Alice and Bob. If the source is placed in-
side one of their setups and only one of the two photons is
accessible to Eve, it seems to us that with protocols that
use more than two bases (the Ekert protocol and the six-
state protocol [40, 41, 42]), a zero-QBER attack using the
approach described in this section cannot be constructed.
However, the six-state protocol implemented on a setup
that uses an external source of entangled photons could
be successfully attacked using a faked pair source similar
to the one described in this section.
1 We make two remarks. Firstly, under the assumptions made,
Eve could reach “unphysical” values of S beyond −2√2 and al-
most up to −4 by increasing the weight Pβ in her statistical mix.
Secondly, now that we know how the states in the combination
β look like, we can simplify Eve’s apparatus by forming the com-
bination α of the same states. In the combination α, Eve can
replace a circular polarization with a statistical mixture of two
states from a single basis used in the protocol. In particular, she
can send either a pair [(|a3〉 or |−a3〉)t+1 , (|b1〉 or |−b1〉)t−1 ] or
a pair [(|a3〉 or |−a3〉)t−1 , (|b1〉 or |−b1〉)t+1 ].
8VI. COUNTERMEASURES
The partial detector efficiency mismatch is a flaw that
is in principle unavoidable. Even if special care is taken
to make detectors identical and eliminate possible con-
trol parameters, finite manufacturing precision will al-
ways leave possibility for Eve to control detector efficien-
cies to some extent. We therefore believe that the best
approach to close this loophole is the following. Through-
out the design, manufacture and quality assurance of the
detectors and QKD system, the worst-case efficiency mis-
match should be specified. It is possible that special mea-
sures would have to be taken to reduce the guaranteed
value of mismatch (for example, in gated detectors it can
be introduction of a random jitter into the detector gat-
ing signal). Then, the worst-case value of efficiency mis-
match should be accounted in the general security proof
for the protocol used, and the amount of privacy ampli-
fication if necessary be increased to guarantee security
of the key. For the BB84 protocol, some quantitative
estimates for the extra privacy amplification exist (see
Sec. II); for other protocols, they are not yet known.
Monitoring the bit rates and coincidence statistics for
different bit-basis combinations is useful as a general pre-
caution. It is good because it can make Eve’s life more
difficult, as well as monitor the health of the hardware
better. However, as we have discussed, Eve might have
ways to maintain the bit rate and coincidence statistics
unchanged, so this measure does not guarantee security.
A countermeasure has recently been proposed in which
Bob randomly switches assignment of his detectors to 0
and 1 bit values by applying an additional pi shift at his
phase modulator [22]. For example, in the BB84 pro-
tocol Bob would randomly apply one of the four phase
shifts (− 3pi4 , −pi4 , pi4 , 3pi4 ) at his modulator to choose a
combination of detection basis and detector assignment,
instead of two phase shifts (−pi4 , pi4 ) to choose the de-
tection basis. This countermeasure would prevent the
straightforward faked states attack, because Eve would
not know how to construct the faked state without know-
ing the assignment of detectors in advance. However, Eve
could run a time-shift type attack [22, 23] in combina-
tion with the large-pulse attack against Bob that reads
his phase modulator settings [19]. In the time-shift at-
tack, Eve only needs to know the assignment of detectors
after she has manipulated quantum states. It is in prac-
tice difficult to protect Bob’s modulator from external
interrogation, because any additional protective optical
components at Bob’s input would introduce unwanted at-
tenuation to quantum states. Thus, this countermeasure
does not seem to be sufficient.
The cases of efficiency mismatch considered in this pa-
per are necessarily idealized. There are many modifica-
tions to the setups that would break the described at-
tacks, e.g., using a slightly wider gate for one detector
than for the other, or having four detectors in the setup
instead of two. However, such modifications do not elim-
inate efficiency mismatch per se, and the problem that
Eve might still exploit it (even if it is a one-sided mis-
match) using a more sophisticated attack remains.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that detector efficiency mismatch can
be exploited to attack the SARG04 and Ekert protocols,
as well as schemes that use the phase-time encoding and
the DPSK protocol. The faked states attacks considered
here might not be the optimal ones; however, they cer-
tainly set upper bounds on the secret information. We
emphasize the necessity of characterizing the detector
setup thoroughly and establishing security proofs with
partial detector efficiency mismatch integrated into the
equipment model.
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